In the past decade East Asia has taken steps to increase regional integration. Th is paper examines the vogue for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) currently raging in China and Japan. After mapping the regional links that knit East Asia together during the 1990s and 2000s, the focus then shifts to the specifi c trade agreements that China and Japan have signed. Both countries exhibit a particular FTA "style;" Japan has adopted a more orthodox and comprehensive approach to its treaties, while China has shown greater fl exibility and gradualism when dealing with FTA partners. It is still unclear whether these eff orts will lead to a region-wide FTA, or a continued crisscrossing of bilateral arrangements. In either case, China's eagerness to adapt to partner country expectations likely gives it an edge in becoming the regional hub of East Asia.
Introduction
Free trade agreements (FTAs) have rapidly proliferated in the new millennium. Countries on all six continents have signed FTAs, fi rst with immediate neighbours, and then farther abroad. Th e notion of a contiguous trade bloc -such as the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) -has been unhinged. In direct to these larger free trade areas, bilateral FTAs have sprung up in many parts of the world.
Even in East Asia, one of the least integrated areas in the world, an FTA race is under way. In the new millennium, a spate of bilateral FTAs has yoked East Asia's largest economies -China, Japan, Korea and Singapore -with countries on various continents, mostly in Asia. East Asia's fi rst FTA, the 2002 Japan-Singapore New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement, has literally ushered in a new age. In search of FTA partners, these countries now scour the Asia-Pacifi c and beyond.
Th is paper compares Chinese and Japanese approaches to FTA diplomacy. Korea and Singapore, important contributors to the East Asian FTA picture, lie outside the scope of this inquiry. Part 2 recounts the affi liations that knit East Asia together during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly the achievements of the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN. Th is background sheds light on the events, motivations and actors animating the current FTA surge. Part 3 recounts the ongoing FTA surge in East Asia. Sparked by Western protectionism and frustration with fruitless World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, East Asian countries have also embraced the global vogue for FTAs. Part 4 analyses East Asian FTAs as examples of international economic law. Th ough still early in their FTA trajectories, Chinese and Japanese FTAs nonetheless show discernible dispositions. Japan prefers comprehensive, "Western-style" arrangements, aiming to capture the entire agreement in a single document. China has taken a diff erent approach, incorporating into its FTAs both Western and Asian legal principles.
Regional Integration: Th e Early Years
East Asian economic integration is not happening in a vacuum, but along paths well trod during the 1990s. Th e present FTA surge retraces the regional architecture laid out during the 1990s. First, regional bodies such as ASEAN and APEC created fora in which East Asian states could discuss and help shape international economic policy. Building on this experience, also known as socialisation, China and Japan have developed methods to integrate their economies into the region. By looking at regional bodies, and then China's and Japan's specifi c regionalisation eff orts, we gain critical insight into today's FTA mania.
Institutions: ASEAN and APEC
2.1.1. ASEAN Like the European Union, the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations responded to a broad array of political, strategic and economic concerns. 1 But unlike the EU or other Western arrangements, the group operates informally and consensually. Historically, it has not made decisions legally binding upon members, preferring instead to operate along the "ASEAN Way" of informality, repeated consultations and consensus-building. 3 Initially, ASEAN focused mainly on political issues: the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, and the promotion of regional stability. 4 Th ese aims and the resultant peace have, of course, contributed signifi cantly to the economic stability and success of Southeast Asia. 5 But only in the wake of economic integration elsewhere in the world did free trade surface onto the ASEAN agenda. 6 While ASEAN has enjoyed modest success in economic integration, 7 its primary contribution to regional integration lies outside the economic realm, and outside of Southeast Asia for that matter. ASEAN is the centre of gravity for this part of the world, rarer still in being comprised solely of Asian states. It continues to inspire trust in the region; often the latest Asian initiative began as a highly successful ASEAN one. Th e ASEAN Regional Forum and the "ASEAN Plus Th ree" (APT) framework exemplify this trend. Both fora have linked China, Japan and Korea with Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent with each other.
APEC
Like ASEAN, the Asian Pacifi c Economic Cooperation off ers proof that regionalism in some parts of the world triggers regionalism elsewhere.
8 Th e late 1980s witnessed two regional shifts that alarmed unaffi liated Pacifi c states, notably Australia and Japan. First, the European Union advanced from a tightly knit customs union to an even more protectionist Single Market in the late 1980s. Second, the 1989 creation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (later NAFTA) further raised the protectionist barriers to unaffi liated states. Seeking to buff et global waves by addressing regional issues, APEC has served as a sounding board, but not much else.
From its inception, APEC aimed to liberalise trade in a soft, aspirational manner. It began "with no organizational framework", 9 nor an exclusivity requirement. Part of its haphazard nature lies in the fact that many original members were already party to other FTAs. 10 And perhaps indicative of its partially Asian constituency, it did not employ legally binding strictures to do so.
Given their diff erent levels of development, geopolitical ambitions and interest in regionalisation, China and Japan have had diverse roles in APEC. China, though not a founding member, has been a comparatively active one. Initially, APEC provided China a voice in regional aff airs it could not have at the global level.
11 Th e organisation's non-binding, non-intrusive nature did not threaten China's zealously guarded sovereignty, and appealed to its hesitant approach to international organisations. At the same time, its economic agenda acculturated China to the new global dictates of lower tariff s, free movements of capital and deregulation.
Japan, in keeping with its relatively low profi le in regional aff airs, has been a lacklustre participant in APEC. 12 Th ough instrumental in establishing APEC, and setting its initial agendas, 13 Japan has since receded from prominence. One critic suggested that Japan had been marginalised into the role of mediator between the unilateral US, with its insistence on free trade, and the wider AsianPacifi c community, which seeks broader cooperation in economic aff airs.
14 Th ere may be some truth to the interpretation, but that does not burnish the rather dim view of Japan's regional leadership. China has also established its own regional initiatives, 20 most notably the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Th is grew out of the "Shanghai Five", an agreement signed by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan for the purposes of "confi dence-building in the military sphere" and "mutual reduction of military forces in border areas". 21 Over time, the countries have committed themselves to non-military threats, such as arms smuggling, drug-traffi cking and religious extremism, 22 and lately toward economic cooperation, energy and trade. China has thus carefully sculpted a credible, and peaceable, regional profi le.
Japan: Regional Production Networks
On the whole, Japan has been a tepid regionalist. Recent events suggest a more dynamic regional policy, but for most of the post-War period, Japanese integration eff orts were limited to the economy. Of course, the Japanese private sector and government have poured money into Southeast Asia, China, Korea and Taiwan.
Th e twin arms of governmental offi cial development assistance (ODA) and corporate foreign direct investment (FDI) created transnational production lines that now snake across East and Southeast Asia. When the cost of manufacturing goods in the Japanese archipelago grew too expensive, automobile and electronics manufacturers off shored their production facilities to Southeast Asia. In any given Honda, for instance, one might fi nd an Indonesian engine, Malaysian fenders, Th ai clutches and a Filipino transmission.
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A similar transnational eff ort converges to produce a Panasonic television.
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Th ese networks created a buff er zone for Japanese corporations as they faced increasingly severe competition from globalisation and Euro-American protectionism. By the end of the millennium, in the eyes of one observer, "Japanese political and business elites viewed the entire [Asian] region … as one organic unit, or what the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) began to call 'a soft cooperation network'". 29 Th is soft network had the added benefi t of keeping a large number of white collar jobs for Japanese executives, who relocated to Southeast Asia in order to oversee the production facilities. 30 It also permitted the transfer of certain technologies from Japan to Southeast Asia, though this has not signifi cantly spurred the capacity for technological innovation in the latter. 31 Despite these achievements, Japan has shown little interest in regionalisation outside of the economic realm. Th is may refl ect in part Japan's unique relationship 32 with the United States, which has forced Japan to take a more limited stance in international aff airs generally and security arrangements in particular. Nonetheless, Japan has been free to pursue other forms of integration, whether in the spheres of politics, monetary integration or culture.
Japan's recently assertive FTA strategy in one way deviates from this low profi le. But it is vitally predicated upon these economic foundations; Japanese investment and aid in Southeast Asia have given it a leg up in negotiating agreements with Singapore, Th ailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
FTA Surge
Th e new FTA boom has roots stretching back to the late 1980s. With the passage of the Single Market in Europe, and NAFTA in North America, protectionism fl ourished. Asia's two largest export markets, Europe and North America, were now considerably more diffi cult to penetrate. Southeast Asia responded in kind, forming its own regional trade agreement in 1992. China, Japan and Korea, on the other hand, initially lacked the diplomatic networks, mutual trust and institutional background that would permit such arrangements. After a decade or so of network building, these countries have entered an FTA boom. Since 2002, China and Japan have each signed three FTAs with countries in Asia and the Americas. Here we examine these arrangements, and then turn to future prospects.
China: Diversity and Conformity
China has signed Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPAs) with Hong and Macao, and FTAs with ASEAN, Chile and Pakistan. 32 It is in late stages of negotiation with both Australia and New Zealand, and has begun talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Singapore and the Southern Africa Customs Union. It has even conducted a feasibility study with distant Iceland, 33 and announced its intention to begin negotiations with Korea. 34 Chinese interest in free trade thus extends far beyond its immediate neighbours in the Asia-Pacifi c, though that continues to be the important locus in its FTA policy.
Th is section examines the four agreements (three foreign, one internal) China has signed. In addition to trade in goods and services, Chinese FTAs promote deeper economic integration through investment measures, protection of intellectual property rights, mutual recognition of standards, harmonisation of custom procedures, and so on. 35 At the same time, it should be noted that China has not taken a cookie-cutter, one-size-fi ts-all approach to FTAs. Rather, with each new arrangement, China has proven itself to be fl exible, dynamic and even conciliatory. Th is makes it a desirable and dependable trading partner for countries throughout the region, and perhaps the world.
Prelude: Hong Kong and Macao
In line with its gradualist approach to opening up to the outside world, China began its free trade journey with the quasi-autonomous territories of Hong Kong and Macao. Th e CEPAS, which brought the former colonies closer into the Chinese fold, marked tentative steps toward freer bilateral trade.
36 Th e agreement aims to "promote the joint economic prosperity and development" of China and Hong Kong, while facilitating "further development of economic links between the two sides and other countries and regions". Trade in services covers various sectors, from the conventional (advertising, accounting, telecommunications, insurance) to the rarer (tourism, legal services, recognition of professional qualifi cations).
39 Given Hong Kong's status as a major fi nancial hub, cooperation in banking and securities was of particular importance. Th e agreement a) permits state-owned banks to locate their international treasury and foreign exchange centres to Hong Kong; b) allows for mainland insurance companies, and other private enterprises, to list on the Hong Kong stock exchange; and c) calls for greater cooperation and information sharing between fi nancial regulators. 40 Quite understandably, China wants to draw on Hong Kong's expertise to build a sophisticated fi nancial sector. Moreover, China Th e Framework Agreement itself off ers only the barest of skeletons, leaving the task of elaboration to subsequent agreements and annexes; CAFTA does not so much declare as unfold a constant work in progress. Th is in itself comes as an innovation, refl ecting concepts that scholars identify with Asian diplomacy generally: informality, incrementalism and minimalism. 46 61 Th e fi rst round of tariff reduction focuses on agricultural products, chemicals, textiles and electronics. 62 Most importantly for resourcechallenged China, copper is also included.
In keeping with the larger trend, the China-Chile FTA extends beyond goods and services. It addresses fair competition, diversifi cation of trade and dispute resolution. 63 In other words, procedure is a critical component to this agreement, and proceeds in elaborate detail.
Investing in the West: Chinese-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement
Unlike CAFTA, the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA) 64 did not spring from a long courtship between the two countries; it took just 18 months and six rounds of talks. 65 While Sino-Pakistani diplomatic relations have been warm for most of their contemporary history 66 (both states were founded in the late 1940s), the FTA still seemed a surprise. China's regionalisation eff orts had focused primarily on Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent on Central Asia. Th e CPFTA attests to both China's newfound desire to be a regional leader, and Pakistan's keen appetite for foreign investment and technology.
Th e CPFTA is not expansive, covering trade in goods and services and investment. It takes an extremely fl exible approach toward tariff reduction, dividing tariff s into fi ve categories, each with a diff erent percentage reduction and implementation deadline. 67 Periodic tariff reviews, including one "at the end of the fourth year or at the beginning of the fi fth year", ensure that implementing future tariff schemes will not damage either side. Th e agreement states that both sides "shall endeavor" to eliminate 90 percent of the tariff lines, but only spells out the reduction of 85 percent of the tariff lines. 68 Flexibility seems the operative word here. 69 In addition, CPFTA slakes some of Pakistan's thirst for foreign investment. 70 It provides protection to Chinese investors in Pakistan, which has already led Chinese companies to invest in Pakistan's industry and infrastructure. 71 Th e fi rst signs are already visible. 72 In this light, free trade seems a distant afterthought to the imminent realisation of fi nancial cooperation. China is steadily cementing its position as a regional power.
Japan: Scratching Beneath the Surface
In contrast to China's newfound enthusiasm for FTAs, Japan has a longer and more contested history with them. During the Uruguay Rounds of the WTO, Japanese delegates aimed to minimise the "adverse eff ects" of FTAs; they wanted the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT) to provide discipline to the formation and regulation of FTAs. 73 Until quite recently, Japan had staunchly advocated multilateral trade.
In the new millennium, however, Japan's fear of being excluded from the "global FTA game" has led to a realignment of its international economic policies. 74 Japan's Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (MOFA) captures this change with paradoxical brevity: "FTAs increase Japan's bargaining power in WTO negotiations." 75 Needless to say, credibility in multilateral institutions is not the primary aim of Japan's Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) policy. Th e MOFA has also noted Japan's desire to facilitate community-building, stability and prosperity in East Asia. 76 For the fi rst time since the Pacifi c War, Japan is seriously attempting to transform its economic capital into political and diplomatic capital; FTAs are the enzymes in this process of conversion.
With three agreements in eff ect, and several others in various stages of negotiation, Japan has entered the FTA age at full force. Technically speaking, Japan has entered the EPA age, which seeks deeper forms of integration in selected areas. 77 Th is section fi rst examines the EPAs with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia, and then takes up Japan's ongoing negotiations.
Japan-Singapore New Age Economic Partnership
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In what has become a standard trend among East Asian countries, Japan chose a comparatively minor trading partner to initiate its EPA strategy. Singapore made a sensible choice for several reasons, not the least of which was its virtually non-existent agricultural sector. 79 experience 81 and strong intellectual property regime persuaded Japanese offi cials that the agreement would make a good "learning experience".
JSEPA encapsulates several features of Japan's grander economic policy. It aims to heighten Japan's regional presence by exporting fi nancial and technological expertise to key Southeast Asian players. Th ough a bilateral agreement, JSEPA envisions Japanese involvement with the rest of Southeast Asia, 82 particularly countries with nascent capital markets. 83 It also incorporates a wide range of cooperative measures in investment, information technology, tourism, science and technology, human resources development and education. Th is is a wide-ranging plan for such a small partner-country, but refl ects Japan's grand ambitions to integrate across geographic and strategic borders.
Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement
In 2004, Japan signed its fi rst, and perhaps only, EPA with a non-Asian state. Availing itself of Mexico's own intricate FTA network of 43 countries, Japan gained tariff -free access to key European, North American and South American markets. 84 Th is is as far as Japan needs to go in the Americas. Mexico benefi ts from lower tariff s on Japan's USD 60 billion food industry. 85 It also hopes to get an investment boost, though this seems unlikely in light of Japan's heavy investment in Southeast Asia. Japan would prefer to consummate EPAs with its existing production lines in Southeast Asia rather than create new ones in North America. Nevertheless, after a year in eff ect, both Japan and Mexico have both seen significant increases in bilateral trade, with Japan doing slightly better. on automobiles and auto parts, bearing the unmistakable stamp of the car industry. For its part, Malaysia will receive a much needed technological and fi nancial boost to modernise its aging factories. Th e agreement eliminates tariff s on 97 percent of the value of bilateral trade, 87 including agricultural products, fi sheries, footwear, rubber and textiles. Th is is good training for the Japanese agricultural sector, which will face even severer competition if and when other agreements with other countries materialise.
Like the others, the Japan-Malaysia agreement aims for cooperation across various sectors. Japan is concerned about the protection of investment and intellectual property rights, while Malaysia looks forward to deepening the "socioeconomic partnership". 88 An example of the latter was announced last October, when Japan agreed to open a "Skills Training Centre" in Shah Alam, 15 miles west of Kuala Lumpur. Th e centre will train "master trainers" in the latest automotive technologies developed in Japan; they will in turn go back to their companies and instruct colleagues.
89 Th e footprint of the Japanese automobile industry is once again apparent, giving Malaysia a slight edge vis-à-vis its regional competitors: Indonesia, the Philippines and Th ailand.
Japan's EPA Future
Japanese EPA diplomacy shows no sign of slowing. Th e present focus is to conclude the ongoing negotiations with Th ailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan has had several rounds of discussions with each country, but cannot convince Southeast Asian auto manufacturers to phase out tariff s on Japanese cars and auto components. 90 Nevertheless, one of these agreements is likely to be Japan's next. 
East Asian FTAs
For the past fi ve years, China and Japan have sown the seeds of regional integration through far-reaching FTA diplomacy. Attention to these new forms of international economic law sheds light on the current boom, and helps illuminate the possibility of future regional integration. A brief overview of the relevant WTO provisions on free trade agreements will help situate the discussion.
Th e WTO and FTAs
As WTO members, China and Japan must abide by certain obligations before establishing free trade agreements. In addition to notifying the WTO, 92 they must satisfy three requirements. 93 First, the elimination of duties and other restrictions must apply to "substantially all the trade" between countries. 94 Second, restrictions on trade with countries outside of the FTA cannot be higher than they were "prior to the formation of the free-trade area". 95 Th ird, the formation of the FTA must take place "within a reasonable period of time". 96 As a developing country, China may avail itself of the less onerous standards articulated in the Enabling Clause. 97 By and large, Chinese and Japanese FTAs liberate substantially all trade, though Japan adheres to this standard somewhat more strictly. Japanese FTAs consistently exceed the de facto standard of 90 percent of trade in goods, with no economic sectors entirely excepted. 98 Japan's EPAs eliminated tariff s on 98 percent of trade with Singapore, 99 94 percent with Mexico and 95 percent with Malaysia.
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Japan has also agreed to do so within the generally accepted "reasonable period" of ten years.
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China has also taken the requirement seriously. Th e agreements with ASEAN and Chile both eliminate tariff s on 90 percent of trade in goods within a decade. Th e agreement with Pakistan, by contrast, does not extend quite so far, in eff ect aspiring to reach 90 percent, but concretely providing for only 85 percent. Nevertheless, given that Pakistan and China can avail themselves of the lower standards dictated by the Enabling Clause, this still represents an impressive eff ort. Again, only time will tell how closely China and Pakistan actually get to "substantially all the trade".
Chinese and Japanese FTAs
China and Japan have evinced diff erent and, to a certain extent, competitive strategies in adapting international economic law to political and diplomatic prerogatives. Scholars have noted the tension generated in Tokyo when Beijing signs an FTA, and vice versa. 102 With each new agreement, China and Japan augment their regional stature.
China has taken pains to accommodate the expectations of partner countries. Chile, as its previous FTAs show, 103 prefers orthodox, comprehensive FTAs, focusing almost exclusively on goods. Accordingly, the China-Chile FTA covers primarily trade in goods, and has few of the innovations apparent in other FTAs. On the other hand, fl exibility is the operative word in the China-Pakistan FTA, which defers key FTA elements -such as which products to lower tariff s on -to later negotiations. Th is kind of uncertainty would be anathema to the comprehensive approach generally favoured in Western FTAs.
Th e China-ASEAN FTA proves to be the most interesting as a specimen of international economic law. Th e "ASEAN Way" of incremental consensus-building emerges as the key characteristic in the ongoing expansion of this agreement. After learning how to cooperate with ASEAN through a decade of political and security initiatives, China has agreed to operate by its cardinal diplomatic principle. With each new annex that China and ASEAN add, the relationship deepens, dispelling Southeast Asian anxieties about the "China threat". Japan has shown a more orthodox approach to free trade agreements, though not woodenly so. Decades of investment and involvement in Southeast Asia have paved the way for Japan's fi rst wave of EPAs in that region. Th is will not only help Japan's key industries (automobile and electronics) acclimate to increased global competition (including China), it could also lead to new forms of regional cooperation, as the training school planned for Shah Alam demonstrates.
Indeed, Japan's new international economic law is most interesting when it deviates most widely from the meat and potatoes of goods and services. For instance, what kind of scientifi c and educational opportunities will the EPA with Malaysia lead to? How can Japanese expertise in the fi nancial services and capital markets sectors be exported to Th ailand? What kind of measures will Japan adopt to allow Filipina nurses and caregivers into Japan? In honing its FTA practices, Japan is closely re-evaluating opportunities and the strengths of its relationships with various "benefactor states" in Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
Since 2002, a new wave of regional integration has swept East Asia. In their own ways, China and Japan have promoted economic regionalisation through a wide array of FTAs/EPAs that crisscross the Asia-Pacifi c. Th is movement has multiple motivations, including the protectionism of regional eff orts elsewhere, heightened competitiveness in numerous sectors and the realisation that interdependency is, quite literally, the way of the world. In addition, the FTA explosion is closely tied to the emerging contest for regional leadership by China and Japan. Both countries have assumed an FTA/EPA strategy that links previous diplomatic eff orts with current economic mandates. While both countries are eager to be the regional hub, it is not clear whether this desire will spark a region-wide free trade agreement, or a continued streak of bilateralism. In all likelihood, only when a signifi cant number of China's and Japan's FTA partners overlap will a regional free trade agreement be imaginable. Alternatively, a neutral third party such as Korea may step in to bridge the diff erences.
